Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: India by Jagdish N. Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: India





Chapter Title: Import Control Policy: Criteria for Allocation and Effects
Chapter Author: Jagdish N. Bhagwati, T. N. Srinivasan
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4509




Criteria for Allocation and Effects
Thischapter considers the methods of administering imports that were generally
in vogue during the period 1956—66. These methods were modified in favor of
more flexibility in the period since 1966, but by 1969—70 the OR-regime had
de facto regressed in the direction of the earlier methods reviewed here with
only modest improvements.
We intend to describe the criteria used in the allocation of imports and
to discuss their general economic implications.' More detailed statistical anal-
ysis of the implications for allocation of investments and capacity underutili-
zation will be deferred until Chapter 13 in Part IV; later chapters in Part
IV will also be addressed to an analysis of the QR-regi.me.2 In the next chap-
ter, we complement our analysis of the anatomy of import control with an
analysis of the anatomy of export promotion until 1966 and its broad economic
implications. And Chapter 4 brings together several of the partial, halting
measures taken before the June 1966 devaluation to soften the restrictiveness
of exchange and industrial licensing.
CRITERIA FOR ALLOCATION
OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
We begin this chapter with a description and analysis of the criteria of alloca-
tion used in India, as part of the import and exchange control policy during
1956—66, to divide up the available foreign exchange among competitive
users. These methods, which involved essentially the operation of a tight
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regime of import (and complementary exchange) restrictions, were put into
operation especially after the 1956—57 exchange crisis.
Organization and Procedures.
The import and exchange policy regime, throughout this period, aimed at
comprehensive, direct control over foreign exchange utilization. Thus admini-
strative decisions had to be made over the allocation of foreign exchange for
practically all uses in the economy. For the overwhelming bulk of imports,
the government (except for a beginning in this direction after the budget in
1965) did not explicitly aim at using tariffs either to siphon off the resulting
import premia or to regulate imports via the price mechanism, the only well-
known exceptions being crude rubber, pulp and waste paper, cotton and
kerosene. Reliance on the direct allocative mechanism was thus almost com-
plete during this period.
The allocation of permissible imports was broadly by two administrative
categories: private sector and public sector. Further, there was an important
operational distinction between imports of raw materials, spares and com-
ponents as against imports of capital goods and equipment. The allocation
of different permissible imports by these categories among industries, and
further still by firms and plants, was carried out by an elaborate administra-
tive machinery which evolved through the period. Since the details of this
evolution are of little economic significance, we confine ourselves here to de-
scribing the system as it was at its peak, around 1965, when it began to be
"liberalized" gradually into the somewhat major changes that came with the
devaluation of the rupee in June 1966.
For every six months, April 1 to September 30, and October 1 to March
31, the Foreign Exchange Budget Branch of the Department of Economic
Affairs in the Ministry of Finance would prepare its estimate of available for-
eign exchange for the six-month period. When the first charge expenditures
such as debt repayments and Embassy expenditures had been netted out, the
residual estimate of available foreign exchange would have to be allocated
among different users. Food, fertilizers, petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL)
and defense would normally be pre-empted first.
The administrative allocation, at the next stage, was essentially at three
points: (1) an allocation was earmarked for the different public sector under-
takings, for both raw materials and equipment, and was assigned to the min-
istries within whose domain they lay; (2) the Iron and Steel Controller would
get a bulk allocation; and (3) the Economic Adviser, Ministry of Commerce,
would get a bulk allocation for the private sector's imports of raw materials,
spares and components (excluding, among other things,iron and steel,
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The industry and unit-wise allocations, under each of these heads, in-
volved a variety of bodies. Frequently, the same unit would receive import
allocations from different agencies: iron and steel from the Iron and Steel
Controller, non-ferrous metals from the corresponding ministry department,
other inputs from the bulk quota of DGTD (Directorate General of Technical
Development) in the Ministry of Industry, and so on.
The licensing procedures, through which each unit had to process all
imports, involved three license-issuing authorities: (1) The Chief Controller
of Imports and Exports (CCI&E), (2) The Iron and Steel Controller (I&SC),
and (3) The Development Officer (DO), Tools, Development Wing of the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Except for iron and steel (cleared by
the I&SC), and certain types of machine tools (licensed by the DO), the
CCI&E controlled the issuance of all other licenses.
The licenses issued by the CCI&E, which constituted the main bulk, were
divided into the following categories: (1) established importers (El); (2)
actual users (AU); (3) new-corners (not covered by El and AU); (4) ad
hoc (covering items such as State Trading Corporation imports); (5) capital
goods (CG); (6) heavy electrical plant (HEP); (7) export promotion, given
as import entitlements to exporters in specific schemes; (8) miscellaneous
categories: such as Railway Contract (relating to orders placed by the Rail-
ways), Replacement Licenses (to replace defective or unsuitable imports) and
Blanket Licenses (mainly for POL).
The procedures followed for each category of licenses, and the authorities
involved in the process, reflected two major criteria:(1) the principle of
"essentiality"; and (2) the principle of "indigenous non-availability." Thus
imports, in terms of both magnitude and composition, were to be permitted
under each category only if some designated agency of the government had
certified that they were "essential" (as inputs or equipment for production).
At the same time, some agency had to clear the imports from the viewpoint
of indigenous availability: if it could be shown that there was domestic pro-
duction of the imports demanded, then the imports were not permitted (re-
gardless of cost and quality considerations). Thus, in addition to the license-
issuing authority, there was a "sponsoring" agency certifying "essentiality"
and a "clearing" agency for "indigenous clearance."
For public sector applications, the procedures were basically similar.
Paradoxically, the procedures were even more complex at times—as when
the sanction of the Department of Economic Affairs had to be obtained, in
addition to indigenous clearance and essentiality certification, for many appli-
cations for raw material imports. Besides, in certain cases, the project author-
ities themselves had the authority to grant indigenous clearance and essentiality
certificates. But these and others were, by and large, differences of detail.38 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
Principles and Criteria of Allocation.
The allocation of foreign exchange among alternative claimants and uses
in a direct control system such as that just described would presumably be
with reference to a well-defined set of principles and criteria based on a system
of priorities. In point of fact, however, there seem to have been few such
criteria, if any, followed in practice. We shall examine, in particular, the
allocations arising from AU licensing.
There are basically two questions of economic significance which need to
be asked here: (1) how were allocations by industry decided? and (2) how
were these allocations further divided up among the constituent firms or units?
We shall examine each of these questions in turn.
ALLOCATIONS BY INDUSTRY
As far as the allocations by industry were concerned, it is clear that the
sheer weight of numbers made any meaningful listing of priorities extremely
difficult. The problem was Orwellian: all industries had priority and how was
each sponsoring authority to argue that some industries had more priority
than others?
It is not surprising, therefore, that the agencies involved in determining
allocations by industry fell back on vague notions of "fairness," implying pro
rata allocations with reference to capacity installed or employment, or shares
defined by past import allocations or similar other rules of thumb.
ALLOCATIONS BY UNIT
The principles and criteria adopted for further subdividing industrial allo-
cations among constituent firms or units were equally without any rationale
other than the spreading-out evenly of a scarce resource on a "fair" and
"equitable" basis. There was a great variety of norms used, with significant
possibility and occasional exercise of discretion. But the overwhelming bias
of the system was toward some form of "equitable" allocations and cuts
therein. This conclusion holds, not merely for the DGTD but also for small-
scale sector allocations, the scheduled industries not on the books of the
DGTD and the other classes of import applicants.
Quality of Information for Assigning Priorities.
As we have already noted, numerous authorities were involved in the
licensing procedure: sponsoring bodies, authorities granting indigenous clear-
ance and actual license-issuing authorities. Each such authority presumed to
act on some set of priorities, in principle, and therefore had to have reason-
able information so as to enable it to exercise its functions meaningfully.IMPORT CONTROL POLICY: CRITERIA FOR ALLOCATION AND EFFECTS39
Although it was impossible to have a meaningful, well-defined set of priorities
at any level in this bureaucratic machine, except in relation to overriding
matters such as defense, no allocations were ever made without intensive
scrutiny and examination of individual applications at each stage in the bureau-
cracy. The quality of the information on which these examinations and en-
decisions were presumably based can be inferred from what is known
about (1) the small-scale sector applications and (2) the working of the
DGTD concerning imports.
SMALL-SCALE SECTOR
The State Directorates of Industries were the authorities which were
supposed to process the import applications in the first instance and to attach
Essentiality Certificates (ECs). While considerable time was indeed taken in
granting these ECs, the quality of the information on which the relevant
decisions had to be made was poor.3
DGTD
The case of the DGTD was hardly any better, despite its obvious ad-
vantages over the Directorates in charge of the small-scale sector. It is well
known, for example, that capacity as well as capacity utilization data, both
of which ostensibly were taken into account in making unit-wise allocations,
are bad. Similarly, with respect to those units which must seek indigenous
clearance from the DGTD, the DGTD directorates frequently maintained
incomplete records of the indigenous suppliers, did not have sufficient in-
formation in adequate detail on what these suppliers could produce and of
what quality, did not distinguish adequately between the mere fact of the ex-
istence of an indigenous supplier and the availability of the supply to an in-
dividual purchaser, and thus ended up occasionally withholding sanction
even for critical imports.
The DGTD not merely tried to secure indigenous clearance prior to per-
mitting imports but even seemed to determine the quantitative mix of per-
missible imports in many cases. Clearly the DGTD had, in the nature of the
case, no capacity to form reasonable judgments on this issue in the absence
of very detailed information on plant conditions—something that was auto-
matically ruled out when we see that the DGTD carried on its book (1965)
over 5,000 units.
Priority in Favor of theSmall-ScaleSector.
While, however, clear criteria for the allocation of imports among alter-
native uses were generally conspicuous by their absence and the informa-
tional basis for decision-making was exceptionally weak, it might be con-40 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
tended that certain broad priorities were pursued by the authorities. Thus, a
typical defense of the import control system was that it was the only way
of ensuring that supplies went on a "fair and equitable" basis to "small" entre-
preneurs. This is not an argument for economic efficiency; but it is a valid
argument for income redistributionifalternative ways of subsidizing the
smaller entrepreneurs are not feasible.
But it is extremely difficult to take this defense of the import control
system seriously. In point of fact, there is reason to conclude that the control
system discriminated against the small-scale sector, as when import cuts in
face of a sudden accentuation of the foreign exchange shortage fell relatively
more acutely on the small-scale sector and much less on the (well-connected)
larger firms. It does not follow, of course, that the small-scale sector would
have either secured greater allocations or been more competitive ifit had
bad to purchase imports in a free market. On the other hand, it does cast
doubt on the usual claim that the import control system made the small-
scale sector better off .than under the import regimes.4
Foreign Exchange Saved from Being Spent on Consumption.
It might be contended that the import policy regime was directed at
preventing scarce foreign exchange from being "frittered away" on consumer
goods and that this general priority was strictly maintained by the import-
licensing authorities. It is certainly true that, over the period of our study,
direct imports of consumer goods were slashed. This was reflected in the
steady reduction of El licenses and the growth of AU licenses granted to
producers. However, two important points concerning this question need
to be made.
1. While imports of manufactured consumer goods indeed went down,
it is pertinent to note that these were frequently offset by growth in domestic
production of the same and other consumer manufactures. In the present
context, where we are discussing the allocation of "maintenance" imports
(i.e., imports of raw materials and intermediates), the following further
point needs to be noted.
2. The maintenance imports necessary to support current production
of domestic consumer goods industries were not negligible. Hazari has worked
out estimates of the direct and indirect import requirements of consumption
in India, divided by these two groups. He finds, for the years 1961—62 and
1963—64, that the proportion of total imports which went to support the level
of consumption of "luxuries" was 7.6 and 8.5 percent, and that of "neces-
sities" was 28.7 and 32.9 percent, respectively.5
In any event, it seems that, irrational as it may be to seek to prohibit
imports of "inessential" consumer goods while permitting their production
domestically, even such an objective could have been as readily achieved,IMPORT CONTROL POLICY: CRITERIA FOR ALLOCATION AND EFFECTS41
with none of the other detrimental effects of a full-fledged control system
embracing all transactions, by a selective set of prohibitive tariffs or quotas
on specific items sought to be excluded from imports.
Corruption and Frustration of Apparent Priorities.
We have noted that the import control system worked on (1) incomplete
and unsystematic information and (2) lack of any discernible economic
criteria. Further, whatever limited allocational aims it may have had were
frustrated, in varying degrees, by the corruption that inevitably arose from
the large premia on imports under the control system.
There are essentially two different kinds of illegality which the control
system generated:(1) since imports were remunerative in general, there
were innumerable bogus claims to import license entitlement under the exist-
ing rules of allocation; and (2) since numerous restrictions obtained with
respect to transferability of imports and import licenses, black markets arose
to transact such illegal traffic. It has not been possible for us to quantify
any of these illegal transactions in a meaningful manner, but there is little
doubt that they existed widely.6 We should also note that these illegal trans-
fers of imports often must have served to increase economic efficiency by
reducing the irrational inflexibility that the legal restrictions on transfer-
ability entailed.
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF IMPORT CONTROLS
What were the economic consequences of these methods of allocating foreign
exchange in India's OR-regime? While we consider the consequences for
resource allocation and capacity utilization, and the growth effects on savings,
research and development, quality of production, inducement to invest and
other aspects of India's economic performance in Part IV, we note here several
other, mainly adverse, effects. In particular, we will consider: (1) delays,
(2) administrative and other expenses, (3) inflexibility, (4) lack of coordina-
tion among different agencies, (5) absence of competition, (6) inherent bias
in favor, ceteris paribus, of industries with imported, as distinct from domesti-
cally produced, inputs, (7) anticipatory and automatic protection afforded to
industries regardless of costs, (8) discrimination against exports and (9)
loss of revenue.
Delays.
The working of any system of allocation will take a certain amount of
time. Even if a free foreign exchange market were to operate, the participants
in the market would have to expend time, for example, in acquiring informa-42 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
tion about availabilities of different kinds of foreign exchange. In principle,
the administrative system of allocations need involve no significant increase
in time, and hence in "delays," over a price system under which scarce for-
eign exchange is rationed out in the market: the introduction of priorities
would, in principle, be equally time-consuming in both cases, though the
procedure would be different, since the price system would involve adminis-
trative decisions as to tax and subsidy incentives whereas the control system
would involve administrative decisions as to quotas.
In practice, however, the exchange control system seems to degenerate
into an inordinately time-consuming allocational device. There are essentially
three reasons for this. (1) In a situation of general scarcity of foreign ex-
change, the definition of priorities becomes exceptionally difficult,as we
have seen earlier, and the system ends up having to accommodate all con-
ceivable demands on some "equitable" basis, while making a pretense of
administering priorities, this pretense frequently taking the form of collection
of yet more information from applicants and time taken in "scrutinizing" it
and "arriving at an informed decision." Delays become, sociologically, the
"conspicuous" substitute for exercise of priorities by the bureaucracy. (2)
Equally important, the multiplication of the bureaucratic apparatus leads in-
evitably to files failing to move quickly and decisions being delayed because
procedures are time-wasting. As we shall see shortly, much of the delay to.
which the Indian import-control system was subject can be put down to the
inefficiency of administrative procedures. For example, where indigenous
clearance had to be obtained by the DGTD from two or more other director-
ates, these were to be sought sequentially rather than simultaneously. (3)
Finally, some significance must be attached, in explaining delays under the
Indian allocation system, to the fact that, with files often moving from the
bottom to the top in the Indian administrative system, they often fail to move
until appropriate graft is paid to the lower-level clerks. If all graft were paid
promptly, there should be no delay on this account; but newcomers and
honest applicants are unlikely to conform readily to this widespread practice,
hence delays occur on this count in the system as well.
Administrative and Other Costs.
The elaborate bureaucratic machinery for operating the licensing mech-
anisms undoubtedly involved direct costs as also the costs resulting from the
necessity for actual and potential entrepreneurs to maintain elaborate and
frequent "contacts" with the licensing authorities. Admittedly, alternative allo-
cation mechanisms also must necessitate "administrative" and information-
gathering costs. But the specific type of "command" mechanism involved in
the Indian QR and industrial licensing regimes added to these costs by mak-IMPORT CONTROL POLICY: CRITERIA FOR ALLOCATION AND EFFECTS43
ing necessary expenditures to ensure "file-pushing" by bribe-seeking bureau-
crats at lower levels, for example. It is highly dubious, for example, that
the considerable growth of Indian Airlines traffic into Delhi from the major
industrial cities such as Calcutta and Bombay and the growth of the license-
allocating bureaucracy in Delhi and elsewhere are anything but a net cost
attributable to the regime. And if we could only disentangle (as we cannot)
the job expansion in the bureaucracy which has resulted from the licensing
machinery, much of the enormous expansion of current governmental ex-
penditures during 1956—7 1 may turn out to be a net cost of the regime.
Inflexibility.
The twin principles of "essentiality" and "indigenous non-availability"
also imparted considerable inflexibility to the pattern of utilization of imports.
This occurred via a rigid itemization of permissible imports, frequently by
specified value for different items, both for AU and El licenses.
At the same time, the theoretical premise that AU allocations were
being made on the basis of well-defined priorities at the detailed industry
level led the authorities to rule out legal transferability of the licenses among
the different industries; and bureaucratic logic took the inevitable next step
and eliminated transferability even among units within the same industry,
thus making AU licenses (legally) altogether non-transferable by the licensee
units. Needless to say, none of the imports under the AU licenses were allowed
to be legally resold either (but were occasionally sold in the black market,
of course).
The rigid pattern of permissible imports (only occasionally adjusted
through changing the contents of the lists by discretionary action) and the
non-transferability of the AU licenses and imports thereunder were bound to
create inflexibility leading to economic inefficiency because:
1. the total AU allocations to individual units were neither made by
well-defined priorities nor based on assessment of reasonably accurate and
analyzed information, but were mostly based on notions of "fair sharing"
with occasional injection of "pragmatism" and "judgmen.t of cases on merits";
2. the itemized breakdowns were based on (a) indigenous non-avail-
ability which, as we have noted, was assessed with inaccuracy by the respons-
ible bodies such as the DGTD, and (b) these bodies' assessment of the
optimal mix of imported inputs, which again was more on an administrative
and Qd hoc basis than on any recognizable criterion of economic efficiency; and
3. there is considerable uncertainty about the availability of foreign ex-
change, leaving aside the general unpredictability of the entire economic
situation, so that no "optimal mix" of inputs laid down in advance (even if
worked out on the basis of well-defined criteria, accu:rately gathered avail-44 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
able information and explicitly assumed future developments) can hope to be
optimal ex post, thus requiring flexibility in the matter of the input-mix and
transfers of inputs from one set of users to another.
Yet another implication of the inflexibility arising from the non-trans-
ferability of import licenses might have been an excessive holding of inven-
tories by Indian firms. Indian inventories, especially the raw materials and
intermediates held, compare unfavorably with those of firms in similar in-
dustries elsewhere. However, other factors on the Indian scene probably
explain these large inventories. For example, interest rates in the Organized
Industrial Sector are quite low, thus making inventory-holding relatively in-
expensive; on the other hand, it is not clear that the relevant Indian interest
rates (real or nominal) have been significantly lower than abroad. Lower
efficiency in transport (and shortage thereof) would also make inventory-
holding more valuable. Furthermore, inventory holdings, including raw mate-
rials and intermediates, appear to have declined (as a proportion of output)
generally through the period of our study, for many industries.7 Hence, while
it makes a priori sense to argue that, ceteris paribus, an import control regime
of the Indian type would tend to inflate inventory holdings, it would not be
correct to argue that the empirical analyses currently available support this
hypothesis.
Lack of Coordination among Different Agencies.
The multiplicity of agencies dispensing imports further accentuated the
difficulty in procuring desired imports on the part of the applicants. For ex-
ample, the typical unit under DGTD jurisdiction would get its share in the
bulk allocations by the Economic Adviser to the DGTD and would also get
allocations of iron and steel from the I&SC's office as well as non-ferrous
allocations from decisions made by the corresponding department (which, in
turn, got bulk allocations for this purpose). Unfortunately, coordination of
these allocations, either in initial allocations or in cuts therein, does not appear
to have been a routine matter.8
Absence of Competition.
In addition, the import allocation system in force had virtually eliminated
the possibility of competition, either foreign or domestic. Foreign competition
was ruled out because of the principle of "indigenous availability": every
item of indigenous production, no matter how much its cost of production
exceeded the landed c.i.f. price, was automatically shielded from competition
through imports, indeed the onus being put on the buyer to show conclusively
that he could not procure the item from indigenous producers.IMPORT CONTROL POLICY: CRITERIA FOR ALLOCATION AND EFFECTS45
Atthe same time, the possibility of domestic competition was, in turn,
minimized by the combination of CG licensing (concomitantly with other in-
dustrial licensing provisions) and the method of AU licensing on a "fair-
share" basis among rival firms in an industry. Strict CG and industrial
licensing eliminated free entry by new firms as well a.s efficiency-induced
expansion by existing firms. And the fact that each firm was entitled to its
"share" of AU licenses, and no more, ensured that the efficient firms could
not even (legally) enlarge output from existing capacity by competing away
the scarce imports from less efficient firms.
Thus, all forms of effective competition, potential and actual, were
virtually eliminated from the industrial system. The effects, therefore, were
(1) to eliminate incentives to reduce costs per unit of output (as the penalty
for sloppy operations was no longer incapacity to survive against more
efficient rivals) and (2) to prevent production from being concentrated in the
most efficient units (and industries).
Bias in Favor of Industries Using Imported Inputs.
Under the actual-user system of allocation of imports, combined with
the principle of indigenous non-availability, it may be expected that the quan-
turn of import allocations would, ceteris paribus, tend to be inversely related
to the availability of indigenously produced inputs.
But this, in turn, would lead to a bias in the effective incentive provided
to the processes using relatively more imported inputs: they would be able to
relatively greater allocations of imports under AU licenses and hence
obtain these inputs at import-premium-exclusive prices (which would include
only the explicit tariff duty) whereas the other industries would have to buy
import-substitute, indigenous items at premium-inclusive prices (since these
items would fetch a price equal to the c.i.f. prices plus the import premium).
The effective incentive given to the former industries or processes would thus
be greater, other things being equal. And, while it may fortuitously be the case
that some of these industries may require relative subsidization on economic
grounds, there is no gainsaying the fact that the import system in India gave
rise to these differential incentives purely as an incidental side effect.
Anticipatory and Automatic Protection to Industries.
Another significant impact of the Indian import policy, under which the
principle of indigenous availability was used to exclude or restrict imports in
favor of purchase of domestic import-substitutes, was that protection was
automatically extended to all industries regardless of cost, efficiency and com-
parative advantage. This automatic protection was further fully to be antici-46 THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
pated by every producer, merely as long as he was willing to make his capacity
and production known to the relevant agencies (e.g., the DGTD) in charge
of "indigenous clearance."
The influence of this policy on the pattern of industrial investments that
emerged through the period must have been considerable. It is clear that the
policy of anticipatory and automatic protection that inhered in the working
of import policy served to divorce market-determined investment decisions
from any guidelines that international opportunity costs (with suitable modi-
fications) might have otherwise provided.
Discrimination against Exports.
Our analysis of the import-control policy would be incomplete if we
were not to mention the rather obvious fact that such a system discriminates
against exports. The effective export exchange rate, on the average, was in-
evitably less than the effective import exchange rate (Table 2—1); and this was
the case at the level of each industry also, until (from around 1962) the
initiation and later intensification of significant export subsidization schemes
began to redress, though not restore, the balance (and, in some cases, must
have even led to a net subsidization rate in excess of the import rate).
Again, one of the important side effects of the principle of indigenous
availability was that exportable items which therefore had to be manufactured
with inferior-quality domestically produced inputs and capital equipment were,
in turn, faced with enhanced difficulties in the highly competitive international
markets. This was particularly the case with the new exports in the engineer-
ing industries, which in any case faced serious difficulties in cultivating foreign
markets almost from scratch.
Further, since there was little flexibility for getting more inputs through
bidding in the market, in view of the restrictive character of the import policy,
and capacity also could not be expanded owing to equally stringent controls
on entry, industries which needed flexibility in production in order to get hold
of large foreign orders, whenever available, found themselves unnecessarily
handicapped.
Clearly, from the beginning of the Second Plan until late 1964, the en-
tire industrial licensing and import policy was unfavorable to manufacturing
exports largely because it was devised with a substantially inward-looking bias.
Loss of Revenue.
Another noteworthy and obvious effect of the import-control system was
the inevitable loss of revenue that it involved in passing the profits on scarce
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(1) Where the imports were channeled through traders, as with El
licenses, there is little reason to doubt that the import premium fully reflected
the scarcity value of the items. It may therefore be expected that,if the
government had channeled these imports through its own agencies or auctioned
them off or levied suitable tariffs, the scarcity premium would have accrued to
it as revenue.9
(2) For the AU imports, it may again be expected that the entrepreneurs
who obtained them would nonetheless proceed to charge for their outputs the
prices that the market would bear. Hence, the effect of raising tariffs by the
"implicit" premium on AU licenses, for example, would not generally have
been to affect the price of the outputs but merely to cut into the profits that
accrued to the entrepreneurs purely as a result of access to scarce inputs.
However, under cost-plus pricing, this result would not follow and it could
not be argued that there was a simple loss-of-revenue effect thanks to the
import-control system. In view of the fact, however, that several import premia
got seriously reduced without there being a significant rise in final prices, sub-
sequent to the devaluation of June 1966, we are inclined to argue that profit
maximization, rather than cost-plus, seems to be a better approximation to the
behavior of Indian firms.'°
Distributional Impact.
We may finally touch on two important "distributional" questions that
have been raised in defense of the direct-allocational system of import regula-
tion used in India.
1.It has, for example, been argued that the method of AU allocations
such that each unit gets some share of the scarce imports ensures that employ-
ment is not eliminated in inefficient units which would, under an alternative
(market) system, fail to bid successfully for the imports. Concerning this argu-
ment, we may quote what one of us wrote elsewhere."
This argument, however, assumes that the increase in employment in
the efficient firms which get more inputs under the [market system] is less
than the decrease that accompanies the failure of the inefficient to get ex-
change (which may be true if the inefficient firms are labour intensive).
It should also be remembered that a policy that creates extra real income
will promote greater capital formation and employment in the longer run.
2. The other argument is superficially more difficult to dispute. It relates
to the fact that regional constraints in a country such as India make it impos-
sible to leave allocations of scarce imports (and materials) to the market.
Since value is attached by each state to production and investment in them-
selves, it is not possible to take the position that allocations should be byIMPORT CONTROL POLICY: CRITERIA FOR ALLOCATION AND EFFECTS51
economic criteria alone and that income transfers shou]Ld be made as compen-
sation to the states that do not attract inputs or investments. In short, the
problem of allocating resources in a federal country such as India involves
economic solutions similar to those that would have to be provided in customs
unions or free-trade areas among sovereign countries where constraints have
to be provided in the shape, for example, of the distribution of manufacturing
investments asawhole among the constituent countries.
But if this is indeed the case, the question again is whether the "subsidiza-
tion" of the states that are likely to "lose" in a system of market-ruled alloca-
tions of AU imports should be undertaken through an import-control regime
with all the disadvantages we have discussed or whether it is not more sensible
to achieve the politically required allocations among regions or states by direct
subsidization policies, such as differential corporation taxes among regions,
which would at the same time permit the import policy to be run on sounder
lines. We have little doubt, in the light of our analysis, that this latter would
be very much the better course.
NOTES
1. This chapter draws on the more detailed analysis in Bhagwati and Desai, india,
pp. 281—334. It may be read in conjunction with Part IV for a continuous and compre-
hensive analysis of the total economic impact of India's import control methods.
2. See Chapters 6, 7 and 9 for further discussion of export. policies and performance
since the June 1966 devaluation. Chapter 14 deals with the economic implications of an
improved export performance (made possible by a change in lrndia's QR-regime) within
the framework of a multi-sector, multi-period planning model..
3. For evidence see the Reportofthe International Perspective Planning Team on
Small industries (1963) and the Report ofthe RajCommittee on Steel Control (1963).
While their critical observations mainly concerned the distribution of scarce domestic
materials, there is no reason to expect that the allocation of import licenses by state
directorates was any more systematic or informed.
4. For a discussion of the discrimination against the small-scale sector that is in-
trinsic to the operation of the import control mechanism, see Bhagwati and Desai, India,
pp. 281—311.
5. B. R. Hazari, "The Import Intensity of Consumption in India," Indian Economic
Review, October 1967.
6. We were unable to successfully use the partner-country-data comparison tech-
nique to detect faked invoicing of imports or exports. For a discussion of this technique
and the problems in using it, see the contributions by Bhagwati, Richter and Morgen-
stern inJ. Bhagwati, ed., Illegal Transactions and International Trade: Theory and
Measurement (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1974).
7. Note, however, that a declining ratio of inventories to output with reduced foreign
exchange under the QR-regime does not necessarily contradict the hypothesis that such
reduction under the QR-regime leads to a higher ratio than such reduction without a
QR-regime.52 THEANATOMY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL
8. It is arguable, of course, that coordination procedures may have led to more
delays; but we doubt this and rather think that sequential clearances are likely to have
been more dilatory.
9. Indeed, this is what it sometimes, but all too infrequently, tried to do when it
transferred the import trade in certain high-premium commodities to the State Trading
Corporation, as with caustic soda. However, even with STC imports, frequently the STC
did not charge the buyers full premium.
10. Of course, the post-devaluation situation was also characterized by a significant
increase in availability of imports for AU licensing, thanks to foreign aid, and soon
thereafter large-scale recessionary tendencies also reduced the demand for imports. How-
ever, the immediate import effect in the three months after the devaluation was not
affected by these complications and does seem to support the conclusion in the text.
11. J. Bhagwati, "Indian Balance of Payments Policy and Exchange Auctions,"
Oxford Economic Papers (February 1962).